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NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL-OFFENSIVE USE OF
EQUITY FINDING ALLOWED IN SUBSEQUENT LAw ACTION. Parklane Ho-
siery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
Shares in the Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc., were offered to
the public in December 1968. Parklane's president, Herbert N.
Somekh, and others affiliated with him, controlled 71.6 percent of
the outstanding shares. The value of the public shares was drasti-
cally reduced during a subsequent recession. Somekh and his affili-
ates decided in 1974 to convert Parklane into a privately owned
company by merging with a new company and purchasing the pub-
lic shares. They caused a proxy statement to be issued to Parklane
stockholders on September 24, 1974, advising that there would be a
meeting on October 14, 1974, to consider the proposed merger. Fol-
lowing that meeting, Parklane merged with New PLHC Corpora-
tion, a private company controlled by Somekh and his affiliates,
and each minority stockholder was paid two dollars per share for his
holdings in Parklane. Dissenting stockholders had the right to ob-
tain an appraisal under the New York Business Corporation Law.
Leo M. Shore brought a stockholder's class action challenging
the veracity of the proxy statement in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., and
twelve of its officers, directors, and majority stockholders, including
Somekh, were named as defendants. The complaint alleged that the
proxy statement:'
(1) Failed to disclose that the purpose of the merger was to help
Somekh meet personal obligations rather than to further any valid
corporate objective;
(2) Failed, in referring to Parklane's termination of lease nego-
tiations with the Federal Reserve Board of New York, to reveal that
continuation of the negotiations could have resulted in substantial
financial benefits to Parklane; and
(3) Failed to disclose that the two appraisers employed by Park-
lane to determine the fair value of its stock had not been furnished
1. Shore alleged that Parklane had violated §§ 10(b), 13(a), 14(a), and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a), 78n(a) and 78t(a),
as well as rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC.
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with sufficient information to prepare a true and complete valua-
tion.
The complaint further alleged that distribution of the proxy
statement was part of a fraudulent scheme giving rise to liability
under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Shore
sought damages, rescission of the merger, recovery of costs, and such
other relief as might be granted by the court.
Before Shore's action came to trial, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) filed suit in federal district court against
Parklane and Somekh. The SEC's complaint alleged that Park-
lane's September 24, 1974, proxy statement was materially false and
misleading in essentially the same respects as those alleged in
Shore's complaint. The SEC sought equitable relief, including the
appointment of special counsel to determine the fair value of the
Parklane shares held by minority stockholders eliminated by the
merger and an injunction against further violations by the defen-
dants of federal securities laws. After a four day trial, the district
court found that:
(1) The overriding purpose of the merger was to enable Somekh
to repay his personal indebtedness and non-disclosure of this fact
in the proxy statement was clearly established;
(2) The proxy material was false in regard to the Federal Re-
serve Board negotiations;
(3) The proxy statement was misleading when it set forth the
fact of an appraisal but failed to disclose that the appraisal was
based upon inadequate and incomplete information; and
(4) These ommissions and misstatements were material. The
court entered a declaratory judgment for the SEC on November 9,
1974.2 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.'
On the basis of the district court's November 9 decision, Shore
moved on November 24, 1974, for partial summary judgment
against Parklane and Somekh,' asserting that they were estopped
from relitigating issues that had been resolved against them in the
SEC action. The district court denied the motion on the ground that
application of collateral estoppel would deny Parklane's seventh
amendment right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed, holding that a party who has had issues of fact
determined against him after a full and fair opportunity to litigate
2. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
3. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
4. Parklane and Sonekh will hereinafter be referred to collectively as Parklane.
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in a nonjury trial is collaterally estopped from obtaining a subse-
quent jury trial on the same issues of fact.
5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because
the position taken by the Second Circuit was in conflict with that
taken by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.' The Supreme
Court held that because Parklane had a "full and fair" opportunity
to litigate its claims in the SEC action it was collaterally estopped
from relitigating the question of whether the proxy statements were
materially false and misleading. The Court affirmed the Second
Circuit's position that application of collateral estoppel did not vio-
late Parklane's seventh amendment right to a jury trial. Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
Collateral estoppel is a branch of the doctrine of res judicata.7
Res judicata is defined as
the principal that an existing final judgment rendered upon the
merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent juris-
diction, is conclusive of rights, questions, and facts in issue, as to
the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.'
Although the terms res judicata and collateral estoppel have been
used interchangeably, they are two distinct principles.9 A judgment
operates as res judicata to preclude subsequent suits on the same
cause of action between the same parties (and those in privity with
them). Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a judgment pre-
cludes relitigation by the parties and their privies of facts and issues
actually determined in the first suit, regardless of whether the sub-
sequent suit involves the same cause of action.0 Simply, res judi-
cata is claim preclusion and collateral estoppel is issue preclusion."
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is based on the policy of limiting
litigation to one fair trial on an issue. 12 The doctrine has the dual
5. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977).
6. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
7. Editorial Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Es-
toppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1010, 1012 (1967).
8. BALLNTrINE'S LAw DICriONARY 1105 (3d ed. 1969).
9. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955); United States v.
Moser, 226 U.S. 236, 241 (1924); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1877).
10. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955); Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
11. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IowA L. Rav. 27, 28 (1964).
12. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 122
P.2d 892, 894 (1942).
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purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an
identical issue in a subsequent action and of promoting judicial
economy by preventing needless litigation.'3 Actual litigation of an
issue is a prerequisite to application of collateral estoppel.1 '
The requirements of due process dictate that a person cannot
be bound by an adjudication to which he was not a party. 5 Collat-
eral estoppel cannot therefore be asserted against a litigant who has
not had his day in court. It will apply only against a party or privy6
to a prior adjudication of the issues sought to be precluded. 7
The doctrine of mutuality limits the use of collateral estoppel
to actual parties or privies of parties of a prior adjudication. 8 The
doctrine states that the party asserting collateral estoppel on an
issue as well as the party against whom it is asserted must have been
parties to a prior determination of the same issue." Mutuality was
requisite to the application of collateral estoppel at common law.20
The early American courts adopted the common law rule that
"there can be no estoppel arising out of a judgment, unless the same
parties have had their day in court touching the matter litigated,
and unless the judgment is equally available to both parties."'
Defensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a defendant
seeks to prevent a plaintiff from litigating an issue that the plaintiff
previously litigated with another party and lost. The purpose of
defensive collateral estoppel is to prevent a plaintiff from relitigat-
ing issues by merely switching adversaries."2 Defensive use was first
allowed as an exception to the mutuality doctrine in derivative lia-
13. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
328-29 (1971).
14. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1948); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§ 68 (2) (1942).
15. Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1934).
16. "A privy is one who, after rendition of the judgment, has acquired an interest in
the subject matter affected by the judgment through or under one of the parties, as by
inheritance, succession, or purchase." Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n,
19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942).
17. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942).
18. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
19. Id.
20. Annot., 11 Eng. Ruling Cases 7 (1897) (quoting the Duchess of Kingston's Case, 34
Lords' Journals 655 (1776)).
21. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 131 (1912).




bility situations. A plaintiff could be estopped from bringing an
action against a master for the actions of his servant if the plaintiff
had previously litigated the same issues with the servant and lost.
This defensive use exception has also been upheld in cases where the
relationship between the defendants in the two suits was that of
principal and agent, and of indemnitor and indemnitee.1
3
The landmark decision expanding defensive collateral estoppel
beyond derivative liability cases was Bernhard v. Bank of America.4
The California Supreme Court in Bernhard reasoned that while the
requirements of due process of law forbid assertion of collateral
estoppel against a party who was not bound by an earlier adjudica-
tion of an issue, there was no reason for requiring the party asserting
the plea to have been a party to the earlier litigation.2 Bernhard
replaced the mutuality doctrine with three requirements for a valid
plea of collateral estoppel. First, the issue decided in the prior adju-
dication must be identical with the issue in the present case. Sec-
ond, there must have been a final judgment on the merits in the
prior case. Last, the party against whom the plea is asserted must
have been a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudica-
tion.26 The language in Bernhard regarding application of collateral
estoppel is broad. The case is limited by its facts, however, to defen-
sive use.
The impact of Bernhard was significant. Many state and fed-
eral courts subsequently rejected the mutuality requirement, espe-
cially where the prior judgment was invoked defensively. 7 The
United States Supreme Court allowed defensive collateral estoppel
in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois
Foundation. 2The Court noted the erosion of the mutuality require-
ment and rejected the requirement in favor of defensive collateral
estoppel in patent infringement cases.
Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks
to foreclose a defendant from litigating an issue which the defendant
previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with another party.
A plaintiff successfully asserting offensive collateral estoppel will
23. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 128 (1912).
24. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
25. Id. at 812, 122 P.2d at 894.
26. Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
27. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
324 (1971).
28. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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prevail on the issues subject to the estoppel without litigating them.
If, for example, one plaintiff established an airline's liability for a
plane crash, subsequent plaintiffs with similar claims need only
litigate the question of damages. The recent cases allowing offensive
collateral estoppel have applied the following requisites to its appli-
cation: (1) The three conditions established in Bernhard must be
met; and (2) The defendant must have had a "full and fair" oppor-
tunity to litigate the issues in the earlier suit."
Factors which have been considered in determining whether a
party had a "full and fair" opportunity are: the forum of the prior
litigation;30 the extent of the litigation; 3' the size of the claims in the
prior and present action; 31 and the forseeability of future litigation
at the time of the prior suit.n
The courts that have abrogated the mutuality requirement
have considered the particular facts and circumstances in each case
to determine whether it is fair to apply collateral estoppel. Consider-
ations of fairness led to opposite results in the Second and Fifth
Circuits when application of offensive collateral estoppel conflicted
with the right to trial by jury. The Second Circuit allowed offensive
use of an equity decision in a subsequent law action .3 The Fifth
Circuit held the seventh amendment right to a jury trial was an
overriding consideration which allowed the defendant to relitigate
issues decided by the equity court.
35
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides:
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any
29. See, e.g., United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E. D. Wash.
and D. Nev. 1962), aff'd sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
cert. dismissed sub noma. United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Bru-
szewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950). Accord,
Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 983 (1966).
30. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
31. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
32. United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra note 27.
33. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 821-22 (2d Cir. 1977); Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
34. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 821-22 (2d Cir. 1977).
35. Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970).
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Court of the United States, than according to the rules of common
law.' '36
The amendment "preserved" the right to a jury trial as it ex-
isted in 1791 when the amendment was incorporated into the Con-
stitution. The fundamental elements of the jury trial are preserved
by the seventh amendment, but the incidental procedures of com-
mon law practice in 1791 are not." Procedural limitations on the
scope of the jury's function, such as the directed verdictu and sum-
mary judgment,3' have been held not to violate the seventh amend-
ment. Any substantive diminution of the right to a jury trial as it
existed in 1791, however, would be unconstitutional.'0
The conflict between the Second and Fifth Circuits hinged on
the issue of whether allowing an equity decision (by the court with
no jury) to act as an estoppel in a subsequent law action (where the
defendant would have a right to a jury trial) was a procedural limi-
tation or substantive diminution of the defendant's seventh amend-
ment right. Both circuit courts relied on Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover," which held that the right to a jury trial of legal issues
should be preserved wherever possible, in cases of mixed legal and
equitable claims, by trying the legal issues first to a jury. The Fifth
Circuit in Rachal v. Hill," in rejecting offensive use of collateral
estoppel, reasoned that Beacon Theatres demonstrated the primacy
of the jury trial right.'3 The Second Circuit in Shore v. Parklane
Hosiery Co." argued that the Beacon Theatres decision would not
have been necessary if not for the fact that an equity decision may
have a collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent law action.' 5
The intercircuit conflict was resolved by the United States Su-
preme Court in Parklane Hosiery v. Shore." The Court decided "not
to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant
trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be ap-
plied."'
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
37. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
38. Id. at 388-93.
39. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902).
40. Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
41. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
42. Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970).
43. Id. at 64.
44. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977).
45. Id. at 820-21.
46. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
47. Id. at 331.
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In addition, the Court held that offensive use of an equity decision
in a subsequent law action did not violate a defendant's seventh
amendment right to a trial by jury.'8
The threshold issue before the Court was whether a plaintiff
(Shore) who was not a party to a prior judgment may nevertheless
use that judgment offensively against a defendant (Parklane) who
was a party to prevent the defendant from relitigating issues re-
solved against him in the earlier proceeding. The Court cited
Blonder-Tongue for the proposition that it is not tenable to afford
a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolu-
tion of the same issue.'" The Blonder--Tongue case, however, in-
volved only defensive use of collateral estoppel. The Court consid-
ered several reasons why offensive use should be treated differently
from defensive use. First, defensive use creates an incentive for a
plaintiff to join all potential defendants," while offensive use en-
courages plaintiffs to await the outcome of other suits against a
potential defendant.5' Second, offensive use may be unfair to a de-
fendant in situations where he had little incentive to defend the first
suit vigorously,52 where the judgment relied on by the plaintiff is
inconsistent with prior judgments,53 or when the second action af-
48. Id. at 337.
49. Id. at 327-28.
50. See Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 865 (1950): "While the claimant was not obliged thus to consolidate his suits, no canon
of fairness requires that he be given the special advantage of twice trying the same issue where
he did not elect to join them." Id.
51. E.g., Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 767-68, 327 P. 2d 111, 115 (1968);
Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 571-72, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1965). But see, Collateral
Estoppel: The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutuality, 41 Mo. L. REv. 521, 537-38 (1967):
The use of collateral estoppel by a non-party as a sword (offensively) as well as a
shield (defensively) may compel defendants to change trial strategy, especially in
multiple-claimant situations. Whereas defendants at one time tried to separate
plaintiffs and prevent class actions in order to force each plaintiff to bear the high
cost of litigation, they may now prefer to have all potential plaintiffs join in one
action, so that the determination will be binding on the plaintiffs as well as the
defendants.
52. See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F. 2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
53. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.
L. REV. 281, 285-86 (1957). Professor Brainerd Currie's famous "Multiple Claimant Anomoly"
situation demonstrates the unfairness of allowing offensive collateral estoppel where the
judgment relied on is inconsistent with prior judgments. Imagine a railroad accident in which
fifty passengers are injured.
The first injured passenger to sue loses his action against the railroad. The railroad
cannot plead that judgment against the next passenger to sue, because the second
NOTES
fords the defendant significant procedural opportunities that were
unavailable in the first action." Reasoning that these problems
could best be dealt with on a case by case basis in the trial courts,
the Court determined that offensive use of collateral estoppel should
be allowed except "in cases where a plaintiff could easily have
joined in the earlier action or where. . . the application of offensive
estoppel would be unfair to a defendant. . . .
The Court applied these criteria to the present case and found
no reason to bar Shore's offensive use of collateral estoppel. Because
a private action cannot be consolidated with one brought by the
SEC without its approval,58 Shore probably could not have joined
in the earlier action. Several other factors contributed to the Court's
determination that there would be no unfairness to Parklane in
applying offensive collateral estoppel in this case. First, Parklane
had every incentive to defend the SEC action vigorously due to the
seriousness of the allegations against them and the pendency of
Shore's private action. Second, the judgment in the SEC action was
not inconsistent with any previous decision. Finally, no procedural
opportunities of a kind likely to cause a different result would be
available to Parklane that were unavailable in the first action.
The Court found no merit in Parklane's contention that the use
of offensive collateral estoppel in this case would violate its seventh
amendment right to a jury trial. Parklane argued that "since the
scope of the amendment must be determined by reference to the
common law as it existed in 1791, and since the common law permit-
ted collateral estoppel only where there was mutuality of parties,
collateral estoppel cannot constitutionally be applied when such
mutuality is absent. '5 7 In rejecting this argument, the Court held
that an equitable determination can have a collateral estoppel effect
passenger was not a party to the first action, nor in privity with the first passenger.
Nevertheless, let us say that the second passenger also loses, and indeed that
twenty-five passengers, in twenty-five separate actions, all fail to establish negli-
gence on the part of the railroad. Then passenger No. 26 wins his action. Are we to
understand that the remaining twenty-four passengers can plead the judgment in
the case of No. 26 as conclusively establishing that the railroad was guilty of negli-
gence, while the railroad can make no reference to the first twenty-five cases it won?
54. The Court considers the presence or absence of a jury a "neutral" factor and not a
significant procedural opportunity. 439 U.S. 322, 332 n.19 (1979).
55. 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g).
57. 439 U.S. 322, 335 (1979).
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in a subsequent legal action and the seventh amendment does not
preclude procedural reforms such as collateral estoppel."
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, would have
held the seventh amendment determinative in Parklane. Rehnquist
and the majority agreed that the amendment protects the jury trial
right as it existed in 1791. They also agreed that it is the substance
of the jury trial right that is to be preserved, not the incidental
common law procedures. Rehnquist contended, however, that offen-
sive collateral estoppel is not a procedural reform, but a serious
diminution of the right to a jury trial in direct contravention of the
seventh amendment
5 9
In addition, Rehnquist argued that notwithstanding the sev-
enth amendment violation, offensive collateral estoppel should not
be allowed in this case. He offered two reasons why "it is 'unfair' to
apply offensive collateral estoppel where the party sought to be
estopped had not had an opportunity to have the facts of his case
determined by a jury."60 First, the use of offensive collateral estop-
pel in this case contravened the strong federal policy favoring jury
trials.6' Second, a jury trial is the type of "procedural opportunity"
that could easily have caused a different result in the second ac-
tion . 2 In applying the majority test of fairness, Rehnquist con-
cluded, the denial of a jury trial should always militate against
application of offensive collateral estoppel. 3
Parklane is significant as the first United States Supreme
Court decision to abrogate the mutuality doctrine entirely. The
Supreme Court replaces the mutuality doctrine in the federal courts
with broad trial court discretion. The Court provides some guidance
for the trial courts with the general rule that offensive collateral
estoppel should not be allowed in cases where a plaintiff could easily
have joined in the earlier action or where the application of offensive
estoppel would be unfair to a defendant.64 Several examples of situa-
tions in which offensive use of collateral estoppel may be unfair to
a defendant were offered by the Court:
(1) A defendant had little incentive to vigorously defend in the
58. Id. at 337.
59. Id. at 344-47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 351.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 353.
63. Id. at 351.
64. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
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first action because he was sued for small or nominal damages,
particularly if future suits were not foreseeable;
(2) The judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself
inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the
defendant;
(3) The second action affords the defendant procedural oppor-
tunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a
different result."
These guidelines would seem to protect a defendant who has
lost one lawsuit from an unfair extension of that judgment through
offensive collateral estoppel. A defendant preparing to litigate an
issue for the first time, however, cannot know whether another court
will later hold the litigation sufficient for the application of offensive
collateral estoppel. He must therefore litigate even trivial claims to
the fullest extent because of their potential collateral estoppel ef-
fect. Greater certainty in the rules governing application of collat-
eral estoppel could minimize this possibility of excessive litigation.
One alternative is to allow offensive collateral estoppel only in suits
that were pending at the time the defendant litigated the first ac-
tion. Another option is to allow collateral estoppel only against the
party who had the initiative in a prior suit. In either case, the trial
court could exercise its discretion to disallow unfair use of collateral
estoppel. A rule which limited the application of collateral estoppel
to certain specified situations would apprise parties of the potential
extent of a judgment prior to litigation and prevent unnecessary
escalation of trivial claims.
Parklane is also significant because of the majority's treatment
of the right to a jury trial in civil cases. The majority does not
consider a jury trial to be a procedural opportunity of the same order
as a convenient forum or full scale discovery. In determining
whether a defendant has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
an issue, the majority considers the presence or absence of a jury a
"neutral" factor." This seems incongruous in view of Beacon
Theatres and the strong federal policy favoring jury trials. It could
have the effect of denying jury trials for all alleged violations of
federal securities law in which the SEC brings the first suit and
wins. It also provides the incentive for a private plaintiff to delay
his action in hope that the SEC will settle the issue for him. The
65. Id. at 332.
66. See 439 U.S. 322, 331 n.15, 332 n.19 (1979).
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Court's decision in Parklane "may well extend to other areas, such
as antitrust, labor, employment discrimination, consumer protec-
tion, and the like, where a private plaintiff may sue for damages
based on the same or similar violations that are the subject of gov-
ernment actions. ' 67
Christopher John Heller
67. 439 U.S. 322, 352 n.20 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
